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 A B S T R A C T  
Some studies indicate that selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) cost have sticky 
characteristics. A cost is sticky when it increases by the time the activity increases, but it 
does not decrease as the activity decreases, in the same proportion as it increases. On the 
contrary, the previous studies focused solely on SG&A costs in, mostly, manufacturing 
companies. This study specifically focuses on specific cost and specific industry. In this 
case, the researchers focus on compensation costs in banks from four South East Asian 
countries. This study chose the banks’ executive compensations since the banks in South 
East Asia have been publicly reporting their compensation. Executive compensation 
itself is a component of SG&A, so it may have sticky characteristic with it. This study 
uses bootstrap method to tackle small sample problem in every country. Results show 
that executive compensations are not sticky, but, on the contrary, anti-sticky since the 
compensation decreases faster when the revenue decreases than its increases when the 
revenue increases. This finding gives a new perspective on the characteristics of executive 
compensation expenses as a part of SG&A cost.  
 
 A B S T R A K  
Beberapa penelitian mengisyaratkan bahwa biaya penjualan, umum, dan administratif 
(PUA) memiliki karakteristik perilaku yang sticky. Suatu biaya dikatakan memiliki 
sifat sticky jika biaya meningkat ketika aktivitas meningkat, tetapi biaya tidak menu-
run ketika aktivitas menurun dalam proporsi yang sama dengan kenaikannya. Berbeda 
dengan studi-studi terdahulu yang hanya berfokus pada biaya PUA dan sebagian 
besar pada perusahaan pemanufakturan, kami memfokuskan pada biaya dan industri 
yang lebih spesifik. Dalam penelitian ini, kami memfokuskan pada biaya kompensasi 
eksekutif pada industri perbankan di empat negara di Asia Tenggara. Kami memilih 
kompensasi eksekutif bank di Asia Tenggal karena bank-bank di wilayah ini telah 
melaporkan kompensasi eksekutif mereka kepada publik. Oleh karena masalah sampel 
yang kecil, kami menggunakan metoda bootstrap untuk setiap negara. Hasil pengujian 
menunjukkan bahwa, kecuali di Pilipina, kompensasi yang diterima eksekutif adalah 
tidak bersifat sticky, tetapi sebaliknya, anti-sticky yaitu bahwa penurunan kompensasi 
lebih cepat ketika pendapatan menurun dibandingkan dengan kenaikannya ketika 
pendapatan meningkat. Temuan ini memberi perspektif baru tentang karakteristik 
kompensasi eksekutif sebagai bagian dari biaya PUA.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Anderson, Banker & Janakiraman (2003) found evi-
dence that SG&A costs are sticky, i.e., the costs in-
crease when the activity rises but they fail to de-
crease in the same proportion when the activity de-
creases. In other words, they found evidence that the 
change in expenses due to the change in activity is 
higher than the change in expenses when the activity 
decreases. Their study is limited to total SG&A costs 
figures and motivates others to investigate compo-
nents of these costs. Anderson, Banker & Janakira-
man (2003) suggest that further studies should inves-
tigate component of SG&A. Until now, there is not 
any study that investigates components of SG&A, 
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including the compensation costs. It is, therefore, 
expected that executives‘ compensation costs have 
sticky characteristic. This study aims to test whether 
executive compensations have stickiness characteris-
tics as found in selling, general, and administration 
(SG&A) 
Executive compensation is tied to performance. 
Previous studies show evidence on the relationship 
between executive compensation and firm perfor-
mance. Harris & Raviv (1979) and Grossman & Hart 
(1983) document that an optimal executive compen-
sation contract must align executives‘ (agents‘) inter-
ests with those of shareholders‘. Other studies show 
a positive relationship between firm performance 
and executive compensation, e.g., Murphy (1985) 
and Mehran (1995). Mehran (1995) provide evidence 
that firm performance has a positive relationship 
with managerial ownership and with equity-based 
compensation. On the other hand, Jensen & Murphy 
(1990) fail to provide evidence of the relationship 
between change in firm value and executive com-
pensation. There are some other studies that investi-
gate the association between executive compensa-
tion and accounting-based performance, e.g., Lam-
bert & Larcker (1987), Banker & Datar (1989), Defeo, 
Lambert & Larcker (1989), Natarajan (1996), and 
Leone, Wu & Zimmerman (2006). Earlier studies that 
investigate the relationship between compensation 
with accounting-based performance aggregate 
measure, e.g. net income (Defeo, Lambert & Larcker 
1989), or ROE (Lambert & Larcker 1987). 
The previous studies suggest that there is a pos-
itive relationship between firm performance and 
executive/manager compensation. A positive com-
pensation implies that compensation increases as the 
firm performance increases. On the contrary, it de-
creases as the firm performance decreases. However, 
there is only a limited study on this issue. Leone, Wu 
& Zimmerman (2006) is one example. They show 
that an equity-based compensation is sensitive to 
either a positive or negative return. Some other re-
searchers predict that the magnitude of change in 
expenses due to the change in activities will be high-
er when the activity increases that when it decreases 
(Cooper & Kaplan 1998, p. 247; Noreen & Soder-
stroom 1997). Anderson, Banker & Janakiraman 
(2003) call this behavior as sticky cost behavior. 
Anderson, Banker & Janakiraman (2003) and 
other studies, for example Subramaniam & Wei-
denmier (2003), Calleja, Steliaros & Thomas (2006), 
and He, Teruya & Shimizu (2010) that test sticky cost 
behavior has focused only on manufacturing, non-
bank industries. So far, there is one research that 
tests the sticky behavior of SG&A costs in bank in-
dustry (Porporato & Werbin 2010). Those studies, 
including the later mentioned study, find evidence 
on the sticky behavior of SG&A costs. 
Until now, there is no study that has tested the 
stickiness of compensation cost in any industry, in-
cluding in banking industry. Banking industry is a 
highly regulated business in many aspects, as com-
pared to other non-financial industries. Recommen-
dation No. 7 of OECD (2011: 28) directs that individ-
ual (or at least aggregate) director- and senior-
executive-compensation arrangements be fully and 
accurately disclosed. 
Focusing on the banking industry is important 
for several reasons. Firstly, banks are regulated to a 
higher degree than other industries. Secondly, the 
contractual environment for bank managers is dif-
ferent from that for other industries‘. A study by 
KPMG (2011) revealed that many banks have signifi-
cantly reduced the variable component of pay and 
increased the fixed aspect of compensation in some 
areas of their business. However, it seems that bo-
nuses still account for the majority of total pay 
awarded to the US and UK banks' highest paid em-
ployees. This is in contrast to Asia where bonus pay 
accounts for between 30 to 60 percent of the total pay 
awarded to senior executives. 
Studies on executive compensation have been 
focusing their attention on the questions on the rela-
tionship between firm or managerial performance 
and compensation. However, most of the studies are 
only interested on answering the question of what 
will happen to compensation if the performance 
goes up, but leave unanswered the question of what 
will happen to compensation if the performance 
goes down. If this type of positive relationship is 
true, that is, the higher the performance, the higher 
the compensation paid to executives; and the lower 
the performance, the lower the compensation paid to 
executives, will proportion of the decline in compen-
sation due to the decline of performance be equal to 
that of the increase in compensation due to the in-
crease in performance? Little is known of what will 
happen to executive compensation when the per-
formance decreases. 
The objectives of this study are twofold. First, it 
tests the stickiness of one of the components of the 
SG&A cost. Anderson, Banker & Janakiraman (2003) 
urge other researchers to study the detail compo-
nents of this cost, to test its stickiness. Second, it fo-
cuses on finding an empirical evidence on the stick-
iness of cash compensations in banking industries in 
four countries in South East Asia: Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Philippines, and Thailand. The researchers chose 
these four South East Asia countries based on their 
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status as emerging countries. In its 2004 survey of 
corporate governance in Asia, OECD reported that 
some countries have started to enforce a better dis-
closure of board and executive compensation 
(OECD 2004). Later in 2007, based on the 2006 sur-
vey, OECD reported that authorities in Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Philippines have mandated public 
companies to disclose total individual remuneration 
paid to directors and key executives (OECD 2006, 
2007). 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESES 
Compensation and Executive Performance 
Logically, an employee, including a company execu-
tive, is paid based on his/her performance. The 
premise is that the higher the performance, the high-
er the compensation. Jensen & Murphy (1990), how-
ever, find that executive‘s compensation is not re-
lated to his/her performance. This study is based on 
the data of salary and bonus paid to CEOs of more 
than 250 major US firms for 15 years. They believe 
that CEO is overpaid, but, unfortunately, his/her 
compensation is far too unrelated to his/her perfor-
mance which is measured by company‘s market 
value. Their opinion is somewhat different from 
Scott‘s (2006, p. 328). He argues that it is difficult to 
put downside risk on an executive since this would 
probably lead to excessive avoidance of risky 
projects. However, forcing managers to bear com-
pensation risk is consistent with agency theory, 
which tells us that, in the presence of moral hazard, 
the manager must bear some compensation risk if 
effort is to be motivated (Scott 2006, p. 323). 
The debate on the overpayment of CEO has 
been around for some time; both in favor or against 
(see for example Kaplan 2007 vs. Côté 2007). Côté 
(2007) provides data that US CEO average compen-
sation is 400 times higher than that received by other 
lower workers in the country, while it is only 30 to 
40 times in Europe in comparable companies. Ac-
cording to Côté, some 30 years before the ratio be-
tween the highest and the lowest pay for workers in 
the US is only 10 times. Therefore, he thinks that US 
CEOs are overpaid. 
Kaplan (2007) disagrees with this idea. He uses 
US data from 1993 to 2005. Kaplan shows that higher 
CEO compensation is, firstly, related to the growth 
of the US economy. Secondly, he admits that CEO 
compensation rises from 1990 to 2000, but declines 
since 2000. The company‘s CEO is not the only one 
that earns higher pay due to the growth of the econ-
omy since 1990. Professional athletes like basketball, 
baseball, and football, and other groups like hedge 
fund, private equity, and venture managers also 
earn higher pay since 1990. Surprisingly, top 25 
hedge fund managers in 2004 earned more than all 
500 CEOs in the S&P 500. Therefore, Kaplan does not 
concur with the idea of CEO‘s overpayment. 
Relating to the relationship between cash com-
pensation and stock return and accounting income, 
there are studies that have investigated this topic, for 
example, those of Bushman & Smith (2001), Lambert 
& Larcker (1987), Jensen & Murphy (1990), and Sloan 
(1993). Bonus contract usually is arranged based on 
accounting income and not specifically based on 
stock return (Murphy 1999, in Leone, Wu & Zim-
merman 2006). Murphy (1999) finds that if a CEO 
reaches his/her performance target, measured in 
ROA or ROE, he/she will receive bonus, for example 
80 percent of his/her salary. Therefore, total pay of a 
CEO tends to relate to firm performance. Murphy 
(1999) reports that 62 percent of performance meas-
ures used in bonus contract are accounting-based 
contracts, while other measures are either individual 
performance, stock price, or some other non-financial 
measures. Among non-financial measures is BOD 
discretion (Murphy & Oyer 2003 in Leone, Wu & 
Zimmerman 2006). This implies that CEO compen-
sation is not always based on the relationship be-
tween accounting and stock performance alone. 
Some discretion from BOD also comes into play. 
 
Executive Compensation and Firm Performance in 
Banking Industry 
Different from other industries, bank is a unique 
industry since it is it must operate within constrains 
of regulators. More control and monitoring mechan-
isms are applied in banking (and other financial sec-
tors) as compared to non-financial organizations 
(Baradwaj, Dubofsky & Fraser 1991, p. 270). Regula-
tion becomes a significant factor in this industry 
because there are a lot of people who deposit their 
funds into banks. In special cases in which all depo-
sitors demanded their deposits back at the same 
time, any bank (even if perfectly solvent) would face 
serious problems in meeting its obligations. This 
condition may lead to banks rush, like during the 
Asian financial crisis which was begun in 1997. In 
general, it‘s highly demanded to regulate bank‘s 
operation in order to monitor the risks assumed by 
the bank‘s management, to assure stability in pay-
ment system, and to avoid negative economic con-
sequences as a whole caused by widespread bank 
failures (Biggar & Heimler 2005). 
Ciancanelli & Gonzales (2000) state that in bank-
ing sector, regulation represent external corporate 
governance mechanism. Together with market sys-
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tem, the existence of regulation will be an additional 
force to discipline bank‘s market and management 
operation. Consequently, regulation mechanism will 
play an important role of banks corporate gover-
nance (see La Porta et al. 1998, Shleifer & Vishny 
1997 for further discussion). In addition to this me-
chanism, banks are increasingly mandated by law to 
establish certain specialist committees as an audit 
committee, a risk management committee, a com-
pensation committee and a nomination committee 
(OECD 2006, 2011). 
Why compensation committee, and why com-
pensation issue is one of the major concerns in creat-
ing good corporate governance in banking industry? 
As a part of the board, compensation committee 
plays an important role in enhancing the effective-
ness of the board by setting executive compensation 
linked more to bank performance. As a whole, com-
pensation can serve as a means of assuring that ex-
ecutive focus on satisfying shareholders, depositors 
and creditors interests. It then becomes a justification 
in many countries, especially in Asian countries, for 
central banks to mandate banks in their jurisdiction 
to disclose compensation paid to bank‘s senior ex-
ecutive, either individually or in aggregate (OECD 
2011) 
As in other industries, there has been increasing 
interest in the importance of executive in banking. 
Barro & Barro (1990), Houston & James (1995), Hub-
bard & Palia (1995), Akhigbe, Madura & Ryan 
(1997), and Crumley (2008) have filled the gap in the 
literature for executive compensation in U.S. com-
mercial banking industry. Crumley (2008) examines 
CEO characteristics and firm data for 36 firms in the 
U. S. commercial banking industry from 2001-2003. 
The results indicate that there is a weak relationship 
between both percentage stock price return and per-
centage return on equity and the percentage change 
in CEO compensation. However, the result shows a 
strong relationship between sales, assets, number of 
employees, and dollar level of CEO compensation. 
Houston & James (1995) study 147 banks in the 
period 1981-1990. They find that cash and bonus 
compensation are significantly less for bank CEOs as 
compared to nonbank CEOs. However, the effect of 
regulatory ratings and supervisory monitoring on 
banks‘ CEO pay is not straightforward. Hubbard & 
Palia (1995) examine 134 banks during 1980-1990. 
They find a stronger pay-performance relation in 
some deregulated interstate banking markets. Earli-
er, Barro & Barro (1990) investigate the relationship 
between changes in bank compensation and perfor-
mance in the 1982-1987 periods. They find that 
changes in compensation are positively related to 
changes in bank performance. All of these studies 
indicate that there is a relationship between CEO 
compensation and bank performance and it can be 
implied that the compensation and performance is 
positive. However, little is known whether this posi-
tive relationship also persists when the performance 
decreases. If the compensation will not follow the 
decreased performance, at least in the same propor-
tion as it increases when the performance increases, 
then, this study suspects that the compensation cost 
may be sticky. 
 
Sticky Cost Behavior 
Traditional model of cost behavior relates cost with 
various level of activities without any consideration 
how a managerial intervention influences resources 
adjustment process. The manager makes some indi-
vidual adjustments of assigned resources because 
some costs cannot change into other costs. It means 
that assigned resources cannot quickly be added or 
reduced as a response to any small changes in de-
mand. Anderson, Banker & Janakiraman (2003) state 
that this cost behavior cannot be judged as a sticky 
behavior. A sticky cost behavior is, actually, caused 
by the process of asymmetric resources adjustment. 
In this case, the manager may allocate more re-
sources as the response to increased activity, but do 
not do the same action in the same quality when the 
activity decreases. 
Theoretically, when demand increases, a man-
ager will locate appropriate resources to meet the 
demand. He/she will do anything necessary to ful-
fill the demand, even though it means that the com-
pany must augment more investment. Here, the 
researchers try to see a positive reaction of the man-
ager. On the other hand, when the volume decreas-
es, some resources that have been put in place pre-
viously may not be utilized. Because a demand may 
be stochastic, the manager has to evaluate whether 
the decrease in demand is temporary or not, before 
he/she decide to use some adjustments. Anderson, 
Banker & Janakiraman (2003) argue that SG&A cost 
stickiness is observed when a manager maintains 
idle capacity instead of bears costs due to the de-
crease of sales volume. They find evidence that 
SG&A costs is sticky since when sales increases as 
high as 1%, SG&A costs increase as much as 55%, 
but, on the contrary, they only decrease as much as 
35.45% when sales increase 1%. 
 
Executive Compensation and Its Stickiness 
Technically, executive compensation is a component 
that comprises the SG&A costs. However, studies on 
cost stickiness only focus on the stickiness of SG&A 
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costs, starting from Anderson, Banker & Janakira-
man (2003). Later, more evidences provided by Sub-
ramaniam & Weidenmier (2003). They explore how 
costs behave for different ranges of sales activity 
changes. They find that SG&A costs and cost of 
goods sold do not exhibit sticky cost behavior for 
small revenue changes. However, when revenue 
changes by more than ten percent, costs exhibit 
sticky behavior. Inter-industry stickiness is also 
found, both for SG&A-cost and cost of goods sold. 
There are at least two studies that investigate 
sticky cost behavior in international context. The first 
one, Calleja, Steliaros & Thomas (2006) provide evi-
dence of sticky cost behavior of firms from four 
countries, i.e. US, UK, French, and Germany. They 
find that operating cost are sticky in response to 
changes in revenue; operating costs increase, on av-
erage, by around 0.97 percent per 1 percent increase 
in revenue, but decrease by only 0.91 percent per 1 
percent decrease in revenues. Comparing French 
and Germany in one extreme law regime and UK 
and US on the other extreme, they find that costs of 
French and German firms are stickier than those of 
UK and US firms. The find that costs in Germany 
and France are more sticky than that of in US and 
UK. They believe that this result is attributable to 
differences of corporate governance and managerial 
oversight systems. Finally, they argue that costs tend 
to be less sticky over longer time horizons and when 
firms sustain larger drops in revenue. 
The second study, He, Teruya & Shimizu‘s 
study (2010), replicates Anderson, Banker & Janaki-
raman (2003) and investigates the determinants of 
cost stickiness in Japan. They find, similar to US 
companies, Japanese firms also demonstrate sticky 
SG&A cost behavior. However, the stickiness of 
SG&A in Japan is less likely to be adjusted due to 
temporary changes in their performance. 
All studies cited above investigate SG&A costs 
stickiness in manufacturing companies. So far, only 
one study that tests this cost stickiness in non-
manufacturing industry, i.e. Porporato & Werbin 
(2010) that test cost stickiness in banking industry. 
Specifically, they compare banks from three coun-
tries: Argentina, Brazil, and Canada, from 2004-2009. 
They choose banks as sample because banks, in 
every country, share the same characteristic, i.e. 
highly regulated. Different from previous studies on 
cost stickiness that test SG&A cost stickiness, they 
test the stickiness of total costs. Total cost definition 
itself are different from a country sample to another. 
The results show that sticky costs are observed in 
banks of Argentina, Brazil, and Canada. They argue 
that total cost in banking industry follows a sticky 
behavior because the magnitude of the increase as-
sociated with an increase in the volume of activity or 
revenues is larger than the magnitude of the fall as-
sociated with a decrease of the volume. 
Even though it has some evidence on the stick-
iness of SG&A across industry (at least for two in-
dustries) and across nations, the researchers still do 
not have any evidence on the stickiness of specific 
components that comprise SG&A costs. Anderson, 
Banker & Janakiraman (2003), in fact, recommend 
further study to investigate those specific compo-
nents. Here, it can be implied that one of the compo-
nents is compensation paid to executives. Logically, 
Anderson, Banker & Janakiraman (2003) provided 
us, when SG&A costs are sticky, the components of 
SG&A costs must also be sticky. The researchers 
must note that, however, not all of cost that have 
sticky behavior. Costs which are not directly related 
to the production factor, for example overhead costs, 
should not change when the sales or activity change. 
The opposite is true when the activity decreases. 
When activity decreases, the costs will not be in-
stantly to decrease when observed. The company 
has to bear large cost if they have to discard or dis-
pose their resource due to the decrease in activity. 
Later, when the activity or sales increase, it has to 
reacquire more resources again. Take employees as 
an example. If the company has to fire some of its 
employee during a crisis, it will find difficulty when 
the activity urges it to hire more men. It is clear to us 
that it will not be easy and cheap to re-hire em-
ployees or find new ones. Hiring some new people, 
when the company activity or sales increase again, 
means also to train them. Therefore, incentive to 
delay the trimming of resources due to the decrease 
in activity is larger than the incentive to acquire 
more resources when the activity increases. Accord-
ing to Anderson, Banker & Janakiraman (2003), 
manager maintains unutilized resources to protect 
him/her from budget cut, to preserve his/her status 
in job market, or to prevent company from losing 
competent employees. These motives drive manager 
to not hastily to lower costs when activity decreases. 
The same is true for executives‘ compensation cost. 
Sticky cost behavior can be explained by agency 
theory. Academician agree that executives may put 
their interest before others‘ (Jensen & Meckling 
1976). Due to moral hazard, executives may ask for 
higher compensation when they perceive their per-
formance increase. On the contrary, they will be re-
luctant to bear consequences of a reduced perfor-
mance. Even though there are some kind of ar-
rangements in their contracts that state what happen 
to their contract when they fail to meet the agreed 
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targeted performance, that failure will not automati-
cally bring down their compensation. In some de-
gree, their compensations may fall, but the decrease 
may not as large as the increase in their compensa-
tion when the targeted performance achieved. 
It means, there is a tendency of stickiness in ex-
ecutive compensation costs, which leads us to our 
hypotheses. 
Ha: Percentage of the increase in cash compensation 
received by bank executives when bank income in-
creases is higher than that of the decrease in cash 
compensation received when the bank income de-
creases. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Sampling and Data Collection 
Public banks in Indonesia, Malaysian, Philippine, 
Thailand and some other OECD member countries 
have released their compensation data in annual 
report since 2008 following a survey and recom-
mendation from OECD in 2007. Even though those 
published data are not as detail as one in the US, 
since, for example, compensations data are only in 
aggregate numbers, not for each executives, at least 
those banks published their cash compensations. 
Cash compensations comprise of salary and bonus. 
Both numbers represent fixed and variable compen-
sations costs and since they belong to SG&A, they 
can be expected to have sticky behavior. 
The researchers collected banks‘ data from four 
countries. In many respects public companies in 
those countries have similarities, especially in terms 
of corporate governance practices due to ownership 
concentration in a small group of shareholders, most 
of them are the founding family who retain their 
control in the form of ownership and managerial 
positions (Claessens, Djankov & Lang 2000). Some 
variations, however, may exist among corporations 
in those countries. For example, based on the OECD 
survey in 2006 (OECD 2007), it is not mandatory for 
a Malaysian public company to disclose individual 
executive compensation although it is recommended 
to do so under Malaysian code of corporate gover-
nance. Other countries have the same requirements 
as Indonesia, which requires those disclosures. This 
study excludes Vietnam and Singapore since they 
both have different market size than the other four 
countries chosen. 
In this study, compensations refer to total cash 
compensation, not split into fixed and variables. 
Every country has its own disclosure requirements. 
For example, firms in Thailand do not disclose sepa-
rately fixed cash compensation (salary and allow-
ance) with variable (bonus), but give detail pay-
ments to their executives; while in other countries, 
like Indonesia, the disclosures are based on types of 
cash compensation, not executives. The researchers 
collected all cash compensation data, i.e. salary and 
bonuses, paid to executives and directors during 
2008-2012. Those data are retrieved from samples 
annual reports posted in their websites or in their 
respective stock markets websites. Banks‘ revenue 
data are retrieved from annual reports and classified 
using World scope definition. Revenues data consist 
of revenues from operations and other operations 
related revenues that comprise operating income. 
The researchers translated particular data to US Dol-
lar for inter-country comparison using daily average 
rate of each currency to US Dollar based on currency 
rate data published by OANDA (2013). 
 
Model 
This study adopted and adapted the research model 
from Anderson, Banker & Janakiraman (2003) to test 
our hypothesis. 
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 (1) 
Where Ct and Ct-1 are compensation in year t and t-1, 
respectively; St and St-1 are revenue in year t and t-1, 
respectively; Dummy_decrease is dummy variable: 1 
if revenue in year t is lower than previous year (t-1), 
0 if otherwise. 
The equation above is used to test the stickiness 
of compensation. The researchers chose total cash 
compensation, i.e., salary plus bonus. Changes in 
activity will be measured by changes in bank‘s reve-
nue. Anderson, Banker & Janakiraman (2003) stated 
that the coefficient of β1 measures the increase of 
percentage in compensation (C) or costs with a 1% 
increase in revenue. This is true since the value of 
Dummy_Decrease is 0 when the revenue increases. 
On the contrary, since the value of Dum-
my_Decrease is 1 when the revenue decreases, then 
the sum of the coefficients, β1 + β2 measures the 
percentage increase in compensation costs with a 1% 
decrease in revenue. They say that if the compensa-
tion costs are sticky, the variation of compensation 
costs with revenue increases should be greater than 
the variation for revenue decreases. Therefore, the 
researchers also propose that the empirical hypothe-
sis for stickiness, conditional on β1 > 0, is β2 < 0. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Compensation Disclosure Practices 
The application of good corporate governance 
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(GCG) requirements, including but not limited to 
compensation, by listed companies in Malaysia and 
Thailand is ―comply and explain‖. Public corpora-
tions in both countries are expected to disclose as-
pects that have not been disclosed and reasons for 
not disclosing them in their annual reports. Guide-
lines of applications are included in each exchange 
market listing rules, while the enforcement of those 
rules is under the authority of stock market regula-
tor. Malaysia and Thailand do not impose any sanc-
tion to any company that is not comply to GCG re-
quirement, while Philippine, where compensation 
disclosure is mandatory, fine a company P100,000 
(around Rp 4.100.000) for noncompliance. 
In Indonesia, the application of GCG guidelines 
are established by both exchange market and market 
regulator and the requirements is voluntary. Specifi-
cally, the GCG guidelines for banks are established 
by Bank Indonesia, i.e., Indonesian central bank, in 
Bank of Indonesia Regulation No. 8/4/PBI/2006. 
Noncompliance of this regulation will be given dif-
ferent level of punishment from written warning to 
severe penalty both to the bank management and to 
the bank operation itself. 
In general, banks in those four countries have a 
compensation committee. They also disclose com-
pensation paid to commissionaires (Indonesia) and 
to company executives. However, it was found find 
that not all banks sampled disclose the amount of 
executive compensation as required or mandated by 
the respective reporting authorities in each country. 
In Indonesia, to begin with, there are seven banks 
(from 2010-2012) that disclose detail components of 
compensations paid to their member board of com-
missionaires and executives, while the rest of public 
banks either disclose the total amount of payments 
made together to commissionaires and executives or 
prepare separate disclosure of both commissionaires 
and executives. Since there is no requirement to dis-
close detail payments to each individual, there is no 
company doing so. Moreover, there is one company 
that only narratively stated the range of compensa-
tion paid to their executives, without specifying the 
amount, even though in previous years it discloses 
the exact number. In other words, there is inconsis-
tency in disclosure practices in Indonesia, even in the 
single company. 
In Malaysia, the reporting authority mandates 
public companies to disclose detail compensation 
paid to each board of director members and to, at 
least, five top member of executives. In our samples, 
four banks report detail compensations as required, 
but the others only report total payments based on 
the compensation components. 
Stock exchange authority in Philippine only re-
quires public banks to disclose their compensation 
policy. Except for CEOs, there is no other further 
explanation regarding this disclosure requirement. 
In terms of the CEOs in Philippine‘s banks, on the 
other side, there must be detail and clear information 
regarding every compensation and non-
compensation plans. In our sample, there are eight 
banks that disclose detail compensation components 
and four of them disclose the highest five payments 
made. In an extreme case, the researchers had one 
company that decline to disclose payment made to 
its executives since the company has net loss that 
year. It is not possible, in fact, that executives are not 
paid at all. Then, the executives may not receive their 
bonuses on that year, but must receive their monthly 
fixed payment. The researchers, however, cannot 
find any explanation on this particular company‘s 
annual report. 
Finally, Thailand explicitly mandates informa-
tion transparency, especially relating to compensa-
tion. They mandate company to disclose directors 
and executive compensation policy based on each 
individual contribution and responsibility as well as 
the type and amount of payments. In practice, it was 
found that all samples disclose detail amount of 
compensation paid to each individuals, but the re-
searchers cannot find any information of its compo-
nents. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents number of publicly listed banks in 
the four countries and samples used. Indonesia has 
the largest banks listed in the stock market, followed 
by Philippines, and Malaysia and Thailand. The lat-
ter two have the same number of listed banks, i.e. 
nine banks. From those populations, only 29 out of 
31 can be used as samples in Indonesia and eight out 
of nine from Malaysia. All banks from both Thailand 
and Philippines can be used as samples. These re-
ductions in samples are due to the incomplete data 
of those samples. The real observation numbers, for 
the whole years, are 124, 40, 52, and 36 for Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand, respectively. 
Some observations must be left out due to insuffi-
cient data of compensation and/or revenue. Indone-
sia has the highest number of public listed banks 
while Malaysia and Thailand are the lowest sam-
pled. 
Table 2 presents average value of sampled 
firms‘ assets in each country. Assets are converted 
from local currencies to US Dollar. Philippines banks 
report the lowest assets, while Malaysian banks have 
the highest assets. On average, the asset value of 
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those banks has increased every year. However, 
banks in Thailand experience significant decrease in 
2009 before climbing again in 2010. The table data 
imply that Malaysian banks are, on average, five to 
eight times larger than Indonesian banks, even 
though the Indonesian banks population is more 
than three times of Malaysian banks. 
Table 3 presents cash compensation paid to ex-
ecutives in four countries. Banks in Thailand pay the 
highest compensation, while Malaysia and Indone-
sia the lowest. The researchers, however, do not di-
vide this compensation to number of executives (in-
cluding BOD number), since the researchers cannot 
acquire number of executives paid for every country 
and company. Therefore, the dollar amount in Table 
3 is the average of five year annual payment in each 
company. The interesting fact, relating to Table 2, is 
that, on average, Philippines executives are paid four 
times higher than that of Indonesian and Malaysian. 
Table 2 shows that Philippine‘s banks assets are only 
around 8-10% of Malaysian banks assets, but their 
executives are paid four times higher than that of 
Malaysian‘s. 
Moreover, Thailand banks paid the highest 
compensation of the four countries studied. Com-
pensation paid to Thailand executive is, on average, 
USD33 million, which is around eight times higher 
than Indonesian and Malaysian banks paid to their 
executives. These seem contrary to the fact that 
based on the assets, banks in Philippines have the 
lowest assets among the other three countries. The 
banks‘ assets are around eight to eleven times lower 
than Malaysian, but their executives are paid the 
highest. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Results of tests on equation (1) can be seen in Table 
4. This study used OLS and bootstrapping model to 
analyze our data. As can be seen on Table 1, observa-
tions are small in countries other than Indonesia. 
Since basing our conclusions on small data may be 
bias if using the OLS, the researchers, then bootstrap 
our data. Bootstrapping allows the researchers to 
have larger data and for this purpose this study re-
sample the data into 1,000 observations. The analysis 
on this finding is based on bootstrapping results 
(presented in parentheses after corresponding OLS 
results). Readers can consult both aforementioned 
tables for OLS regression results as well, since both 
give relatively the same conclusions. 
In Table 4, Indonesian samples log revenue is 
statistically significant (alpha 1%). Generally, based 
on OLS and bootstrapped results, the researchers 
can conclude that changes in revenue correlate to 
changes in executive compensation. The positive 
sign of β1 (bank‘s revenue) measure the percentage 
increase of executive compensation when the reve-
nue increases. The statistically significant finding 
indicates that it confirms Anderson, Banker & Jana-
kiraman‘s (2003) prediction that compensation in-
creases as bank‘s revenue increases. In our case, for 
every 1% increase of a bank‘s revenue, the compen-
sation increase as high as 71%. 
The same positive sign of β1 is found in Malay-
sian samples. The log revenue is also statistically 
significant (alpha 5%). OLS and bootstrap methods 
give us the same conclusions. The increase of 1% of 
revenue in Malaysian will be followed by 177% in-
crease in executive compensations. However, it can-
not be concluded in the same way for Thailand and 
Philippines samples. The β1 for Thailand is not sta-
tistically significant (alpha >10%). The test on the 
Philippines samples also does not give a statistically 
significant result (alpha >10%). Therefore, for both 
Table 1 
Public Banks and Samples (2008-2012) 
Country Listed Banks 
Usable samples 
Bank Numbers Observation Numbers 
Indonesia 31 29 98 
Malaysia 9 8 31 
Philippine 13 13 35 
Thailand 9 9 29 
 
Table 2 
Assets Value Comparisons (in Million USD) 
Country 
Assets 
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Indonesia 14,343 9,221 7,635 6,456 5,664 
Malaysia 73,098 67,160 51,310 43,256 40,581 
Philippine 8,105 6,298 5,161 6,093 4,486 
Thailand 45,147 39,607 33,235 19,854 27,234 
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countries, the researchers cannot conclude a positive 
relationship between pay and performance of their 
banks executives. 
The interaction of dummy decrease of revenue 
with log revenue is statistically significant (alpha 
5%) for Indonesian samples. However, the negative 
β2 and positive β1 do not indicate that Indonesian 
banks‘ executive compensation is sticky (Anderson, 
Banker & Janakiraman 2003, p. 53). Yet, it is anti-
sticky because the absolute of negative β2 is larger 
than β1. In order to confirm cost stickiness, Ander-
son, Banker & Janakiraman (2003) state that the sum 
of β1 + β2 should be greater than the variation of 
revenue decrease. The sum of β1 + β2 is 0.717 + (-
2.525) or equals to -1.808. It means that, for every 1% 
decreases in Indonesian bank‘s revenue, the com-
pensation decreases as low 180%. Malaysian banks 
also indicate the same behavior of anti-stickiness. 
The decrease of executive compensation can be as 
low as 85% (or 1.767 – 2.618) in Malaysia. 
These findings are contrary to the expectation 
that compensation costs show stickiness characteris-
tics, i.e. the magnitude of the decreases of compensa-
tion for each percentage of the decrease of revenue is 
lower than that of the magnitude of increase of com-
pensation for each percentage of the increase of 
bank‘s revenue. The fact is, when the revenue de-
crease, the compensation decrease faster than the 
revenue. Therefore, instead of being sticky, the com-
pensation shows a behavior opposite to the stick-
iness. This behavior is not as expected and since the 
behavior is contrary to the sticky behavior, it can be 
called as anti-sticky behavior. 
The researchers, moreover, have statistically 
significant interaction variable coefficient for Thail-
and. However, as seen in Table 4, the coefficient of 
log revenue variable is not statistically significant. 
Anderson, Banker & Janakiraman (2003, p. 53) sug-
gest that β2 should be negative, conditional on posi-
tive value of β1 to conclude cost stickiness. Since β1 
is not statistically significant, the researchers cannot 
conclude the stickiness (or, as Indonesian and Ma-
laysian show, anti-stickiness) of Thailand samples. 
Lastly, anything cannot be concluded from the re-
sults of Philippines because the model is not statisti-
cally significant. The coefficients of two variables are 
also not statistically significant. 
 
Additional Analysis 
Banker, Fang & Mehta (2013) posit that a company‘s 
manager may adjust current cost based on the condi-
tion of prior year‘s resource level and on the next 
year‘s expected performance level. If the manager 
believes that future performance can increase, then 
he/she may expect an increase of resources. For ex-
ample, if the forecast shows that an increase in sales 
Table 3 
Comparison of Executive Compensation (on Average, in USD) 
Country Compensation (Fixed and Variable) 
Indonesia 4,971,596 
Malaysia 4,166,764 
Philippine 16,723,064 
Thailand 33,486,581 
 
Table 4 
Results of Hypothesis Testing with Bootstrap Corresponding Value in Parentheses 
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Variables 
Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Philippine  
Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
Constant 0.012 0.700 
(0.357) 
 0.042 0.458 
(0.209) 
0.048 
(0.021) 
0.025 
(0.013) 
 -0.077 0.691 
(0.368) 
 0.008 0.846 
(0.437) 
Ln Revenue 0.717 0.018 
(0.004) 
** 
*** 
1.767 ** 
** 
3.532 0.153 
(0.105) 
 0.107 0.485 
(0.171) 
Dummy * 
Ln Rev 
-2.525 0.107 
(0.020) 
 
** 
-2.618 ** 
** 
-8.081 0.016 
(0.010) 
** 
*** 
1.690 0.680 
(0.334) 
F 0.046** 0.057*  0.053 0.672 
Adj-R2 4.3%  12.7%  14.1% 3.1% 
N 
(observations) 
98 
(1000) 
31 
(1000) 
 29 
(1000) 
29 
(1000) 
*, **, ***: statistically significant at, consecutively, alpha 10%, 5%, and1%; C: compensation paid to executives; S: bank revenue; Dummy-
Decrease: 1 if year t revenue is lower than year t-1 revenue, 0 if otherwise. 
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to be expected, the manager has to consider the in-
crease in company‘s resources, like its plant, sup-
plies, inventories, sales forces, and so on. If those 
anticipated increase in resources are already in the 
company, for example its plant or sales forces, then 
the manager will have to retain them to stay in the 
company. It is not a wise choice, for example, due to 
the decrease in the current year‘s sales if the compa-
ny to reduce its sales forces or, else, to liquidate its 
warehouse. If the company let go of its sales forces 
or liquidate a warehouse in an area, more resources 
are needed if sales increase in the future. They have 
to recruit and train new sales forces. The cost to re-
cruit and train new people can be higher than the 
cost to keep current and available sales forces in the 
company. The same is true if the company to has to 
keep current warehouse in the time of sales decrease 
or to buy (or rent) a new one when the sales increase. 
As Anderson, Banker & Janakiraman (2003) pre-
viously put, in a period where there is an increases 
of sales, a manager is more inclined to add re-
sources. For example, if the demand increases, the 
manager may respond it by opening some new out-
lets. However, the manager is less inclined to reverse 
the commitment in the next periods even though the 
sales decrease. It implies that manager responses less 
to a sales decrease, but puts more response to a sales 
increase. This is what Anderson, Banker & Janaki-
raman (2003) call cost stickiness. 
Contrary to the optimism that creates cost stick-
iness, pessimism can also cause an asymmetric cost 
behavior. In the case of pessimism, manager will cut 
cost larger due to the decrease in sales, but will only 
cause smaller increase in cost due to increase in 
sales. For example, during a time of a crisis, a small 
decrease of sales, e.g. 5%, will cause the manager to 
fire sales forces more than the number of sales forces 
hired when the sales increase by 5%. This is because 
a highly pessimistic manager will anticipate much 
lower resources needed for the company‘s future 
operation. Cutting current resources, during time of 
a crisis, will reduce both costs related to company‘s 
current operation as well as future operation. On the 
contrary, when the current sales increase, a manager 
who is highly pessimistic will only put resources 
(e.g. hire new sales forces) that are really need to 
fullfil current requirements. For example, if the sales 
increase 5%, the company only hires some sales 
forces that can handle that sales increase. This ma-
nagerial pessimism what Banker & Byzalov (2014) 
call a anti-stickiness cost behavior. 
Previously, Banker, Fang & Mehta (2013) find 
evidence of anti-sticky cost behavior during 2008 
crisis. Our firm-year observations starts from 2008, 
when the crisis erupted. Since our samples are banks 
whose business are highly related to this financial 
crisis, the compensation behavior may be explained 
by this phenomenon. Based on this argument, the 
researchers put an additional analysis on our hypo-
thesis. The researchers put bank‘s previous perfor-
mance as an indicator of this pessimistic/optimistic 
managerial decision using research model from 
Table 5 
Results of Sticky/Anti-Sticky Cost Behavior Conditional on Prior Period Revenue and Bootstrap 
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Variables 
Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Philippine 
Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
Constant 0.201 2.609 
(3.049) 
** 
*** 
0.194 1.023 
(0.955) 
0.062 
(0.063) 
0.294 
(0.272) 
 0.052 0.796 
(0.931) 
1.215 
(1.383) 
0.430 
(0.100) 
0.088 
(0.054) 
-0.451 
(-0.300) 
0.049 0.643 
(0.559) 
INCi,t-1lnSi,t 0.460 6.170 
(3.963) 
*** 
*** 
0,065  0.361 0.324 0.807 
(1.279) 
INCi,t-1 
Deci,tlnSi,t 
0.467 4.640 
(2.938) 
*** 
*** 
2.228  1.482 0.671 0.224 
(0.141) 
DECi,t-1lnSi,t 
 
0.494 2.524 
(2.155) 
** 
*** 
0.916 0.659 
(0.412) 
 
 
0.036 0.742 0.939 
(0.789) 
DECi,t-1 
Deci,tlnSi,t 
0.636 2.208 
(0.736) 
** 
** 
2.293 0.435 
(0.297) 
 -0.445 0.365 0.092 
(0.198) 
F 91.627*** 0.344  0.711 0.497 
Adj-R2 78.9%  9.3%  4.3% 6.5% 
N (observations) 98 
(1000) 
31 
(1000) 
 29 
(1000) 
33 
(1000) 
*, **, ***: statistically significant at, consecutively, alpha 10%, 5%, and1%; C: compensation paid to executives; S: bank revenue; INCt,t-1: 
1 if revenue increased in year t-1, 0 if otherwise; DECt,t-1: 1 if revenue decreased in year t-1, 0 if otherwise; DECi,t: 1 if revenue 
decreased in year t, 0 if otherwise; lnSi,t: log-change in bank revenue in year t. 
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Banker, Fang & Mehta (2013). 
The coefficients 1PIncr and 2PIncr (or 1PDecr and 
2PDecr) correspond to β1 and β2 in the Anderson, 
Banker & Janakiraman (2003) model for the subsam-
ple of observations that follow a prior sales increase 
(or decrease). Similar to Anderson, Banker & Janaki-
raman (2003), a negative β2 indicates cost stickiness, 
i.e., costs falling less for sales decreases than they rise 
for equivalent sales increases. Conversely, a positive 
β2 corresponds to cost anti-stickiness, i.e., costs fall-
ing to a greater extent for sales decreases than they 
rise for sales increases. 
The test results in Table 5 show that for Indone-
sia, 1PIncr and 2PIncr are statistically significant (al-
pha 1%), either using original data or bootstrapping. 
The coefficient 1PIncr can be interpreted when the 
bank‘s revenue increases in prior period, the execu-
tive compensation rises as high as 46% for every 1% 
of the increase of bank‘s revenue. However, the posi-
tive 2PIncr does not support the prediction as in 
Banker & Byzalov (2014), and Banker et al. (2014) 
and the coefficient should have been negative to 
imply a sticky cost behavior. 
This finding is interesting since for Indonesian 
samples, i.e. ones that experience revenue increase in 
the prior period, the decrease of their revenues in the 
current period of 1% is, surprisingly, followed by the 
decline of executives compensation as high as 92%, 
i.e. the sum of 1PIncr and 2PIncr (46%+46.7%). It 
means that the decline of current bank‘s revenue will 
be followed by the decline of total executive‘s com-
pensation that is bigger than the increase of compen-
sation caused by the equivalent increase in revenue. 
It is implied that this significant decrease of compen-
sation act as a punishment mechanism to the execu-
tives. The prior period‘s increased of revenue cannot 
reduce the managerial pessimism. This pessimism is 
then reflected on the significant decrease of compen-
sations paid to executives. External factors, like 2007-
2009 financial crisis, may play a significant role 
pushing the compensation lower. 
The test results when the prior period‘s revenue 
decreases (1PDecr and 2PDecr), support the anti-sticky 
behavior of executive compensation. This cost beha-
vior can be concluded from statistically significant 
value of 1PDecr and 2PDecr (alpha 1%). The 1PDecr 
coefficient indicates that, when prior period‘s reve-
nue decreased, the executive‘s compensation de-
creases as much as 49.4% for every 1% of decreased 
revenue in the current period. This decrease in reve-
nue is bigger than the decrease of compensation 
when prior period‘s revenue increased (see the coef-
ficient of 1PIncr). To compare both current period 
decreases, the punishment is stronger to a company 
that experiences a decrease in revenue in its prior 
year (49.4%), than to a company that experiences an 
increase in its prior year (46%). 
If after a decrease in a prior year the company‘s 
revenue keeps on decreasing in the current year, the 
punishment is worse. The compensation decreases 
as much as 113% to every 1% of the decrease in 
company‘s current period revenue. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that, for Indonesia banking samples, 
executive compensation show an anti-sticky cost 
behavior, especially when they experience a revenue 
decrease in the previous year. 
In sum, these results provide some additional 
evidences of the anti-sticky cost behavior in our In-
donesian samples. Since our samples are from the 
2007-2008 financial crisis periods, the managerial 
pessimism is reflected into the compensation paid to 
the banks‘ executives compensation. 
However, unlike Indonesia, it cannot be con-
cluded in the same way for the behavior experienced 
by banks in Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines. The 
results indicate no statistically significant coeffi-
cients, so there is no indication which can be drawn 
of any cost behavior. The explanation may relate to 
the characteristics of banks in those countries in 
dealing with the same financial crisis. Further re-
search may study the influence of specific country in 
dealing with crisis and its effect on the cost behavior. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
Claessens, Djankov & Lang‘s (2000) study suggest 
that most public companies in East Asia (including 
South East Asia) were founded and owned by a fam-
ily. Most of those families are still the controlling 
owners of those companies. In this type of company, 
the owner may put their interest before others. This 
policy may be at the expense of minority sharehold-
ers‘ interests (Zhuang 1999). Many post-crises has 
been utilized in many Asian corporations. However, 
some think that those efforts are based on the Anglo-
Saxon model. Applying this model in Asian culture 
may only touch the outer layer of the problem since 
the concentrated ownership structure and institu-
tional, and socio cultural norms attached in local 
economy (Nam & Nam 2004). 
Nam & Nam (2004) study the corporate gover-
nance in four Asian countries (South Korea, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, and Thailand). They find evidence that 
companies in these four countries give a good op-
portunity to their shareholders to participate in deci-
sion making and use their rights as shareholders. 
However, their study also find, among others, that 
board of directors are relatively weak in selecting, 
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monitoring, and replacing the CEO; in evaluating 
key executives and directors compensations. Implicit 
in this statement is that there are still many corpo-
rate governance problems experienced by compa-
nies in Asia. There are, of course, some adjustments 
made, like compensation disclosure. OECD (2004) 
reports that some Asia countries have strengthen 
their directors and executives compensation disclo-
sure. Authority in Indonesia, Thailand, and Philip-
pine have mandated individual compensation dis-
closure by public companies. This disclosure practice 
is a type of information openness appreciated much 
by the public. Public has the right to know where the 
investors‘ money goes since those executives and 
directors are paid using their money and the money 
should be invested in the right investment. Nam 
(2006) find that senior managers‘ compensation is 
one the main indicators used by market participants 
to value a bank. 
Our main objective of this study is to test 
whether the compensation costs are sticky. Ander-
son, Banker & Janakiraman (2003) encourage future 
study to test the stickiness of the components of 
SG&A costs. Their study tests the stickiness of SG&A 
costs to activities as measured by revenue. This 
study replicated their study by investigating the 
stickiness of compensation costs paid to executive. It 
chose the banks‘ executives because their compensa-
tions data are already available to public. Four South 
East Asian countries are chosen. 
The results confirm that executives‘ compensa-
tion increase as their banks‘ revenue increase. It is 
true for Indonesian and Malaysian banks. This study 
does not have the same conclusion for Thailand and 
Philippines banks since the related coefficients are 
not statistically significant. For the earlier two coun-
tries, the increase of their executives‘ compensation, 
for every 1% increase of revenue, is surprisingly 
high, i.e. 71% in Indonesia and 177% in Malaysia. No 
similar conclusion, unfortunately, can be drawn for 
samples taken from Thailand and Philippines banks. 
The tests on the stickiness of compensation costs, 
unexpectedly, reveal the opposite conclusions. When 
both coefficients of β1 and β2 are summed up, the 
researchers found the additions of both coefficients 
result in negative values for both Indonesian and Ma-
laysian data. This negative number may indicate a 
behavior contrary to the positive value, in this case 
indicating a behavior contrary to the stickiness. It is 
called an anti-sticky costs behavior of compensation. 
Additional analysis confirms that cost behavior is 
anti-sticky for Indonesian samples, but no conclusion 
can be made on the other three countries. 
The question is, then, what this anti-sticky cost 
may suggest. Intuitively, this phenomenon may in-
dicate that the executives are punished because of 
the decrease of the revenue. The punishment, how-
ever, seems to be more severe than expected. If An-
derson, Banker & Janakiraman (2003) hypothesize 
and find evidence that the absolute change in com-
pensation when the performance increase is larger 
than when it decreases, this study found the con-
trary. The decrease of executives‘ compensation is 
surprising. 
The next question is how the executive may 
have been punished? Do the punishment in the form 
of reduced compensations are from fixed or variable 
compensations, or both? These may be the future 
questions to ask since the disclosure practice is still 
in its immature state. Almost all samples in our 
study disclose compensation paid to board of com-
missionaire (specific for Indonesia) and executives of 
each company. The researchers, actually, expect that 
every company disclose separately cash compensa-
tion into fixed (i.e. salary, allowance, and the like) 
and variable (i.e. bonus). Salary is paid based on 
contract while bonus is based on performance. 
Therefore, the analysis based on the division of 
compensation into fixed and variable components 
can shed more light than the analysis based on the 
total amount of both numbers. 
The additional analysis also suggests that it is 
only for Indonesia. In this study, it was found the 
different compensations disclosure practices in each 
country. For example, only banks in Malaysia that 
disclose detail components of compensation and 
four companies in Malaysia disclose the payment 
made to each executive. In Indonesia, most of the 
banks compile the compensation into one number, 
each for commissionaires and executives. Thailand‘s 
banks disclose the amount paid to every executive, 
but do not split it into fixed and variable. Lastly, 
some banks in Philippines only disclose cash com-
pensation paid to some of its executives and disclose 
the rest into one number. Therefore, it is important 
to have a uniform disclosure to put all the country 
into analysis. A more detailed disclosure of compen-
sation is important because fixed cash compensation, 
for example, cannot be changed easily into variable 
one. If the fixed cash compensation dominates, it can 
be predicted that total compensation cost might be 
sticky than when variable cash compensation domi-
nates. Then, it can also be predicted that if the fixed 
one dominates, managers will be more likely to shirk 
since they will bear no risk when firm performance 
declines. 
Another important point is the disclosure of 
compensation paid to each executive. In each com-
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pany, there must be one or more executives that are 
responsible to the firm‘s revenue. For example, the 
relationship of chief of marketing executive to sales 
is stronger than the same relationship to chief of 
human resources or chief of information executive. 
The compensation paid to each of them is based on 
different, at least some if not all, indicators. Future 
study should consider the relationship between par-
ticular executive‘s compensation and firm perfor-
mance and the stickiness of that executive compen-
sation. 
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